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The article discusses how ethnography can contribute towards the development of 
sociological theory.  It uses a case study of one theoretical idea refined through 
ethnographic fieldwork – Phil Strong’s (1979; 1988) work on Erving Goffman’s 
theory of ceremony.  The article argues that (1) Strong was able to subject Goffman’s 
ideas to empirical testing and (2) was successful in further developing Goffman’s 
ideas on ceremony.  In doing so, he (3) demonstrated that ethnography can be more 
productive in developing theoretical ideas, but this relied upon Strong’s personal 
enthusiasm for theory and fieldwork .  His theoretical empiricism provides an 
exemplar of the way theory and conceptual refinement can grow as a result of doing 
ethnography the right way.. 




We should […] study the typifications available to actors and the rules, often 
unstated, that govern their application.  Where these have become relatively 
institutionalised – as in particular schools, hospitals, etc. one can then attempt 
to work back to the subjective meaning for actors of a particular form of 
behaviour.  Sociology obviously does not stop here – rather it provides us with 
a firm base from which we can then go on to ask the more interesting 
questions perhaps of the origins of the typifications who has the power to 
define and apply them what are their functions for the groups who use them? 
Etc. (Strong 1969:3, emphasis added). 
 
What this paper offers is, I hope, an empirical way forward  
with one bunch of his ideas (Strong 1988:230). 
 
Introduction 
A quarter of a century has passed since Goffman1 observed the apathy that greeted his 
own attempts to establish the interaction order as a legitimate field of sociological 
investigation (Goffman 1983).  In 1988, Strong similarly noted “the peculiar 
reluctance by many sociologists to concede any importance to the micro sphere” 
(Strong 1988:229) and twenty-first century sociologists have also continued to 
express disappointment with the obscure status of interactionism within the 
sociological canon (Atkinson and Housley 2003; Maines 2001; Dingwall 2001b; 
                                                 
1
 Admittedly, there are substantive question marks over whether Goffman can be considered to be a 
symbolic interactionist, as some introductory textbooks label him (cf. Giddens 1988).  Goffman 
himself was resistant to this; in interview (Verhoeven 1993); in lectures in fieldwork (Goffman 
{Lofland] 1989); in his summary of his own career (Goffman 1983); in response to others’ critiques 
(Goffman 1981) and in personal communications (Strong 1983).  These were the rare instances where 
reflections were ferreted out of him.  His work is hence best categorized as exploring what he termed as 
‘the interaction order’ (Goffman 1983). 
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Manning 2005).  Such marginality seems all the more surprising given the explosion 
in qualitative methods and ethnographic approaches associated with an interactionist 
tradition.2  Implicit here, therefore, is the suggestion that there has been a lack of 
engagement with theoretical ideas by qualitative, ethnographic researchers – or at 
least that the former has failed to match the latter’s success.  Of course, theory is only 
one outcome of such research and the article is not seeking to suggest that alternative 
goals or outcomes are less desirable or valuable.  Rather, the emphasis is upon the 
positive role ethnographic research can fulfill for theory and that therefore this should 
sit alongside alternative goals such as policy, evaluative or even emancipatory 
objectives.   
 
Appropriately enough, in making a case for a greater interest in developing theory 
through ethnography, an empirical success story is appealed to.  Strong’s work on 
Goffman is applied to demonstrate how past ethnographic fieldwork has succeeded in 
refining theoretical ideas.  The ultimate aim of this case study is to inspire the 
flourishing qualitative, ethnographically-orientated research tradition to engage more 
proactively with an interactionist theoretical agenda.  This continues Hammersley 
(1992) and Atkinson’s (2005) various calls for qualitative/ ethnographic research to 
be more minded towards its theoretical antecedents and that that both theory and 
method have much to gain from a closer dialectic. 
 
                                                 
2
 The would-be ethnographer is now overwhelmed by the number and range of textbooks available: 
from the generic introduction (Brewer 2001); the manual for the more experienced (Atkinson et al. 
2003); to the sub-disciple-specific texts (Pole and Morrison 2003; Delamont 2001).   
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Strong and Goffman: the case study. 
Atkinson and Housley (2003) identify Strong’s (2001) [1979] study of the ceremonial 
order as an example of fieldwork based theoretical development that is, to their 
knowledge, unanalysed as an example of theoretical accumulation, despite being “one 
of the classic works” (Black 1996:2) and “being widely read, cited and pinched” 
(Bloor 1996:552).   Such examples are rare (Hammersley 1985, 1992).  Strong’s 
(2001) was one of two, interconnected monographs to have emerged from a single 
fieldwork project (Strong 2001; Davis 1982).  Atkinson and Housley (2003) note that 
the differences between them has not been examined in detail3 and this article does 
not examine the contrasts and connections (Bloor 1996) between the monographs, but 
rather it focuses upon Strong’s monograph and subsequent commentary on that work 
(Strong 1988) as a case study model of empirical theoretical accumulation.   
 
On closer inspection, Strong’s work is intriguing on two grounds. First, as a rare 
example of an ethnography containing a theoretical accumulation agenda and, second, 
as a sustained attempt to follow Goffman’s sociological legacy.  For Bloor, “it has 
come to represent a systematic empirical demonstration of the analytic potential of 
Goffman's writing in a particular field setting” (Bloor 1996:553).  In respect of the 
latter, that Strong’s self-confessed passion (Strong 1983, 1988; Bloor 1996; Murcott 
2006) took him in this direction is unusual.  Not in the sense that Goffman is an 
obscure, unpopular sociologist, quite the contrary (cf. Williams 1986; Manning 1992, 
Goffman 1997; Fine and Smith 2000; Smith 2006), but rather that not many have 
                                                 
3
 Davis (1982) in his acknowledgements, and somewhat confusingly, points out their different 
objectives. 
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attempted to develop his ideas so explicitly4.  Strong offers his own detailed, reflexive 
account of his approach to pursuing Goffman (Strong 1988).  It is this, key article 
(Strong 1988) and Strong’s (2001) research monograph that inform the argument 
made here, as others have commented upon Strong’s work and legacy elsewhere 
(Black 1996; Bloor 1996; Murcott 2006; Pope 1995; Dingwall 2001a).5  The opening 
quotation by Strong, back in 1969, reveals that his interest in taking some of the 
questions raised by interactionism into the field long pre-date the study itself.  It is 
towards this wider agenda – how ethnography can contribute to theory – that Strong’s 
work is used here, rather than his specific accumulation of one of Goffman’s ideas. 
 
Strong on Goffman 
A significant proportion of Strong’s (1988) article focuses upon the dilemmas and 
pitfalls associated with following Goffman.  This is an important and essential 
prelude, as Goffman’s sociology defies ready categorization and there is no single, 
clear direction that can be readily identified when appraising Goffman (Williams 
1986; Williams 2007).  Strong (1988) perceived that this was due to Goffman’s 
“idiosyncracies6,” so whilst clearly an admirer, Strong was not blind to what he 
politely termed Goffman’s “theoretical and empirical frailties” (Strong 1988:229).  In 
his lectures on Goffman, Strong also interestingly avoids over-identifying himself 
with Goffman’s position.  For Strong, these frailties were inherent in both Goffman’s 
method and his theoretical ideas: 
                                                 
4
 Whilst many studies draw upon Goffman’s ideas in a more general sense (often uncited), Strong was 
unique in his explicit and extended focus upon one of Goffman’s ideas on ritual order and because he 
contextualized these ideas within Goffman’s wider conceptual legacy and subjected them to empirical 
testing. 
5
 Murcott’s  (2006) preface to her edited collection of Strong’s work invites readers to see the persistent 
elements across Strong’s thinking.  This is an important take on Strong that will be returned to.  
6
 Perhaps here this is a symptom of Goffman’s striving for the interaction order to be taken seriously – 
hence the myriad of labels, concept and angles. 




[He was] a cynic, a wit and a literary stylist; all potential sources of 
misunderstanding […] In addition to these sins, he invented a cornucopia of 
theoretical terms – but changed them in almost every book (Strong 1988:230). 
 
For Strong, an ethnographer with a zest for fieldwork (Bloor 1996; Black 1996), the 
challenge was clear:  
He never studied the minutiae of any particular ceremony, never 
systematically examined any specific rules of relevance or irrelevance, never 
rigorously probed the workings of this, or that, ritual equilibrium.  For some 
this is a terrible fault but […] Goffman was not a researcher in any 
conventional sense.  He was a theorist working in an unexplored area, trying 
to make some sense, as best he could, of a huge and unfamiliar terrain.  What 
he has to offer is, therefore, an array of (merely) plausible ideas – of possible 
forms processes, rules, tasks and problems.  Of course, Goffman’s best may 
still turn out to be better than most others.  But when we get right down and 
look in detail at a particular bunch of encounters, who knows what we will 
actually find? (Strong 1988:234-235, emphasis added) 
 
In Goffman, Strong perceived a rich mine of ideas that Goffman himself had not 
subjected to systematic or rigorous empirical study.  Goffman’s own commitment, as 
best it can be summarized, was to establish the interaction order with a 
phenomenological content as an important domain warranting serious sociological 
attention.  He was, at it were, exploring new virgin territories and it was left to others 
to seek more substantiated conclusions.  In his final paper (his presidential address to 
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the American Sociological Association,) he reflected that he did not feel “our claims 
can be based on magnificent accomplishment. Indeed I've heard it said that we should 
be glad to trade what we've so far produced for a few really good conceptual 
distinctions and a cold beer” (Goffman 1983:17).  His ideas therefore form a basis for 
potential for future theoretical development or accumulation.  Even more 
tantalizingly, Goffman had left certain avenues that have been neglected by 
subsequent scholars: 
 
The analysis of etiquette – of that ritual order which links the micro to the 
macro world, lending weight and stability to each and every encounter – is 
central to Goffman’s writings.  Yet most subsequent commentators and 
researchers have had little to say on ceremony.  This article tries to redress the 
balance (Strong 1988:228). 
 
Strong’s task was to develop Goffman’s theoretical ideas by empirically examining a 
‘bunch of encounters’.  As to whether Goffman’s ideas can be considered solid 
enough to constitute ‘theory’ Strong was again well versed regarding Goffman’s 
proclivities, arguing that “Goffman may have changed his terms but he rarely changed 
his tune” (Strong 1988:228).  It is on this assumption of a consistency in theoretical 
ideas within Goffman’s work, rather than the existence of a grand meta-narrative or 
fixed method, that Strong worked.7   
 
                                                 
7
 This is a significant assumption.  Not all commentators on Goffman would agree with such an 
interpretation.  However, as Goffman himself argued, his work was for others to interpret and then 
work from their interpretation.  He could not dictate a reading (see Verhoeven 1993). 
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Strong on Goffman on rituals. 
Strong’s (1988) chapter explicated his approach to rendering Goffman’s work 
empirically testable.  There is a real risk here that Strong misinterpreted Goffman’s 
work and/ or that Goffman himself would resist any such attempt to systematize his 
work and construct systematic theory.  Certainly, Goffman (1983) expressed his 
distain for those with the temerity to attempt the latter during his lifetime.  But he also 
observed that: 
 
It seems to me that you can’t get a picture of anyone’s work by asking what 
they do, or by reading explicit statements in their text what they do.  Because 
that’s by and large all doctrine and ideology.  You have to get it by doing a 
literary kind of analysis of the corpus of their work.  (Goffman, in Verhoeven 
1993 [1980]:313). 
 
The above could be read as permission to proceed in any direction (whereas Goffman 
himself was focused on the same track and with the same purpose8).  Indeed, perhaps 
this reveals a much wider problem with Goffman’s work, namely, that it has become 
just about anything to anyone.  Strong, at least, provides a detailed explication of his 
take on Goffman’s analysis – and certainly in greater depth than Goffman tended to 
himself. 
 
First, Strong evaluated Goffman’s work on the ritual order before moving to devise 
“systematic ethnographic methods for its [further] analysis” (Strong 1988:229).  On 
                                                 
8
 Although some disagree that Goffman was consistent, they detect the outlines of a theory of an 
interaction order across his work (see Rawls  1987). 
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Goffman’s approach to theorizing rituals, Strong (1988) immediately perceived some 
difficulties: 
 
Since he was primarily a theorist he was not too fussy about the means by 
which he derived his terms, or the manner in which others might 
operationalize them.  And since he was driven on by his desire to map, 
however provisionally, the many contours of his presumed newfound domain, 
he tended to love the view he had just noticed and be bored by 
autobiographical exegesis.  Precisely how he had got there, how one foray 
linked with another, were usually matters of little interest.  Thus the more 
systematic explorers who plod after him are faced with both a vast terrain and, 
littered across the landscape, a multitude of exploratory terminologies, most of 
them intriguing but many apparently abandoned. (Strong 1988:230) 
Strong’s reading of Goffman on rituals perceived the metaphors of play and frame 
(for example, the rules of the game) to be central.  Rather than frivolous, Strong 
argued that Goffman’s use of these metaphors was central to the interactional order – 
in that they addressed the very construction of social reality: 
 
Mutually sustaining a definition of the situation in face-to-face interaction is 
socially organized through rules of relevance and irrelevance.  These rules for 
the management of engrossment appear to be an insubstantial element of 
social life, a matter of courtesy, manners, and etiquette.  But it is to these 
flimsy rules, and not to the unshaking character of the external world, that we 
owe our unshaking sense of realities (Goffman 1961, cited in Strong 
1988:232). 
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Following Goffman, Strong argued “the ceremonial order of the encounter, the 
etiquette that can be found on any social occasion, is not some trivial matter, of 
interest solely to mothers, pedants and social climbers, but has instead a profound 
importance for the viability of the micro-social order” (Strong 1988:231).  
Sociologically, this is where the action is.  As such, Strong (1988) perceived that “the 
little world of the encounter is not a fragile thing.  Instead, it is an extraordinary 
robust structure, capable of ignoring all kinds of routine trouble” (Strong 1988:232).  
As such, it warranted serious sociological attention.   
Unraveling the encounter further, Strong (1988) perceived two tensions in Goffman’s 
thinking.  First, a Machiavellian focus on explicating “merely overt ceremony,” 
performativity and covert power and, secondly, a more Durkheimian concern with 
wider social values that ceremony celebrates irrespective of dubious outcomes (Strong 
1988:233).9  From this, Strong assumed any investigation of ceremony must consider 
both overt and covert power in interaction – and also this celebratory aspect of ritual.  
In this, Strong noted Goffman’s emphasis upon idealisation, which is “essential to 
proper performances; it is in this sense that the world is a wedding” (Strong 
1988:234).10  This also echoes Goffman’s work on Felicity’s condition – the 
obligation within all social actors to demonstrate competence through their social 
actions, not that they always chose to do so (see Goffman 1983).   
In summary, Strong (1988) proceeded into the field equipped with Goffman’s 
emphasis upon (a) the sociological significance of the encounter; (b) that wider power 
relations have a bearing upon how negotiations play out inside an encounter and; 
                                                 
9
 Here, writers on Goffman have often perceived him to be amoral (Willmott et al. 1979).  However, 
there is an argument to be made that his was a critique of power relations and inequalities in society 
(Williams 2007) and Strong certainly represented Goffman as such in his lectures. 
10
 “The world, in truth, is a wedding” (Goffman 1959:36). 
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finally (c) that hence the definition of the situation achieved in an encounter is both 
controlled and controlling: 
idealization and celebration is a joint task in which everyone has a part to play; 
but at the same time it is based on a purely temporary agreement.  The ritual 
order is simply an overt display, a performance, which may well conceal great 
covert differences in opinion and power.  Some people may be forced to 
celebrate against their will.  Finally, the moral rules which compose any 
particular ritual order get their sustained reality from a further set of rules – 
rules of relevance and irrelevance – which govern precisely which matter the 
participants may focus on and those which they must gloss over and ignore.  
The joint idealization of this (often) purely working consensus depends on a 
shared and systematic inattention to anything that might disrupt the overt order 
of things. (Strong 1988:234) 
To take this focus into the field, Strong was well aware that society offered a whole 
myriad of different encounters: 
Goffman’s theory of the ceremonial order of encounters could be explored in 
many ways.  The way I chose was to concentrate on just one type of encounter 
– paediatric consultation – and to explore this via intensive ethnographic 
methods (Strong 1988:235). 
 
Strong’s fieldwork 
The fieldwork was conducted in the UK and the USA and formed part of a wider 
project with co-researcher Alan Davis.  Their specific focus was upon power and 
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ceremony as played out in encounters inside the medical setting.  Whilst only 
medically-related encounters, the potential to be highly varied and challenging in 
terms of seeking a pattern and also in physically managing a substantial dataset.  As 
Strong himself described, the task was to “gather systematic data (via handwritten 
verbatim notes) on the interaction in 1120 paediatric encounters” (Strong 1988:235).   
The setting of the encounters was located inside a clinic and one hundred observations 
were made in an “eastern city of the United States” including both fee-paying 
(private), charity and others paid for by the Federal Government and a thousand were 
also conducted in a Scottish city (of similar size to its American counterpart) that 
were all National Health Service (NHS) clinics (state-funded) (Strong 1988:235).  The 
dataset crosscut different types of clinic and therefore inevitably included different 
doctors (N=40), “though focussing principally on just a handful” (Strong 1988:235).  
The fieldwork was conducted over a period of three years and, in overview, contained 
many of the essences of an ethnographic approach; immersion; observation; and 
emphasis upon unfolding interaction (Hammersley and Atkinson 2007). 
 
Rather than apply a working hypothesis or anticipating in some way what may occur 
in the consultations, Strong applied another of Goffman’s concepts – systematic 
inattention – to his fieldwork.  Simply, this sought to understand what facework 
underpinned a ‘successful’ encounter (and hence avoided an unsuccessful one).  This 
was an exploratory approach, but immediately created the dilemma of “how to 
discover what might have been there but was instead systematically excluded?” 
(Strong 1988:235).  In other words, how to problematize the encounter of patient and 
doctor in the clinic and hence render its contents open to critical analysis?   
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Strong focused upon the participants themselves and the role they fulfilled in the 
encounter’s ritual pattern.  This led him to comment upon the medical authority and 
competence of key actors, for instance, “the portrayal of the doctor as obviously and 
necessarily competent [that] depended simply on being a doctor” (Strong 1988:235).  
In overcoming this impasse, Strong used the same technique Goffman had applied to 
damaged social identities – by looking for the exceptional case.  As Strong noted, 
“how does the fish get to notice that it is surrounded by water (since it is there all the 
time)?  Only when it is hooked out on to dry land, when it encounters the deviant 
case” (Strong 1988:236, original emphasis).11  The breakthrough, ‘deviant’ case 
emerged from the American dataset.  In contrast to the UK clinics, which were all in 
National Health Service (NHS) and hence government funded contexts, the American 
dataset contained both fee-paying and voluntary/ charity settings: 
 
In the United States one saw, at least in some clinics, routine happenings that 
never or almost never occurred in any Scottish clinic […] what was 
systematically absent from most NHS consultations […] routine occurrences 
in private practice revealed systematic absences in that of the NHS (Strong 
1988:236, 237).  
 
This distinguished between patients and their orientation towards their fee-paying 
status, or lack thereof, as “Scottish patients [Strong refers to the parents here] never 
displayed such open consumerism [as their American equivalents]” (Strong 
1988:237).  The way in which Strong had collated his data – including the basic 
constitutive data for every encounter – allowed the differences to be traced.  These 
                                                 
11
 Murcott (2006) notes that this was a technique Strong returned to across his career. 
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included: the beginning of the consultation (“the ‘workup’ by an intern”); social class; 
what level of decision-making has already taken place prior to the encounter (e.g. 
whether the patient has already seen another specialist and is seeking another 
opinion); rights and practice (i.e. the right to a second opinion which “in practice few 
patients dared”); and the private/ NHS patients and doctors distinction already noted 
(Strong 1988:37, op. cit).   
 
Strong went on to use this distinction between private and NHS consultations to 
unravel the encounter in greater depth.  For example, as to whether doctors chose to 
comment on other doctors’ views (rarely in the case of NHS consultations), Strong 
found that “what is for sale here are highly specific skills and contacts […] colleagues 
are also competitors; patients can and do go elsewhere” (Strong 1988:238).  
Therefore, the doctor’s authority could be challenged – but only in certain contexts.  
The exact circumstances of such contexts led Strong to focus expressly upon 
dominance and passivity and he then used his fieldwork data (now that he knew what 
he was looking for) to seek out further examples for analysis.   
 
The analytic breakthrough was therefore significant and drew from his fieldwork and 
also guided the unfurling process of analysis.  Strong adapted his methodology to test 
his idea through further fieldwork to discover if they could be supported.  He refers to 
the “careful analytic techniques” of constant comparison (Glaser 1964) and analytic 
induction.  His approach therefore contained two, relatively distinct approaches to 
theorizing: one generating; another testing.  From Goffman came the initial 
conceptual focus that informed new empirical research examining in a specific social 
context; with that body of data came a theoretic breakthrough and further analysis of 
Ethnography’s capacity to contribute to the accumulation of theory: a case study of Strong’s work on  
Goffman.  
 15 
that dataset refined that theory.  So in the second (perhaps more traditional) stage of 
his research, Strong is merely detailing the “sequence of data-gathering and 
hypothesis-testing until no further body of data produces any significant modification 
to the developed hypotheses” (Strong 1988:239).  It is a clear process of cyclic 
analysis in which theory and method intertwine and is close to the model of analytic 
induction that Hammersley (1992) values as a means to achieve theoretical 
development through ethnographic research.  The quality of Strong’s initial dataset as 




My data were collected all in one go.  So, instead, I simply divided them; the 
first half being used to generate detailed hypotheses (via constant comparison) 
about the ritual order of the paediatric clinics; the second half to test those 
same hypotheses.  How, then, did Goffman’s theory of encounter etiquette 
stand up? (Strong 1988:239-240) 
 
The development and refinement of Goffman’s theory of encounter etiquette. 
Strong followed Goffman’s example by delineating the roles found in encounters.  
Using his ethnographic data that detailed the minutiae of the exchange, Strong 
confirmed “that each [of the] participants was offered a heavily idealized public 
character (whatever their private qualities) and the combined set of ceremonial 
identities formed a harmonious and smoothly interlocking whole” (Strong 1988:240).  
For example, on “consultation etiquette”, (Strong 1988:240) identified two equally 
central dimensions to the ceremonial order: the “technical competence of server and 
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client” and “their moral character” (Strong 1988:240).  These were overpowering in 
their active construction of a morally sound character, even despite evidence to the 
contrary.  For example, “every Scottish mother was nominally treated as loving, 
honest, reliable and intelligent” (Strong 1988:240) even in such instances where the 
baby was grossly overweight.  It was this element – of the moral character of the 
patient – that Strong further addressed in close detail and which is therefore the 
element of Goffman’s work he developed.  That is, the active maintenance of the 
moral character of patients in the ritual order of the encounter – and the circumstances 
in which this could be breached. 
 
Strong found that three qualifications could be made to Goffman’s notion of polite 
disattention or what Strong referred to as the ‘rules of irrelevance’.  “Rules of 
irrelevance enabled a prolonged mutual engrossment in the action almost regardless 
of circumstance” (Strong 1988:241-242).  The first of these qualifications or 
exceptions is what Strong termed “the unmentioned ideal” (Ibid, original emphasis).  
Here Strong argued that the “rule of irrelevance could go rather further than Goffman 
implies” (Strong 1988:242).  Indeed, that in not making something out to be 
significant revealed its very significance.  That is, it was “the routine omission of the 
very things that were being idealized” that proved important in his observations 
(Strong 1988:242).  Strong, with characteristic style, was celebrating the tension 
between the fragility of the encounter and its controlling characteristics: 
  
A ritual is thus involved but one of some delicacy.  This is (quite often) one of 
those religions where the name of God cannot be mentioned. (Strong 
1988:242) 




The second qualification or adaptation that Strong made to Goffman addressed 
ceremonial orders.  This is was perhaps the most significant innovation, as it involved 
reworking “key aspects of Goffman’s theory of etiquette” (Strong 1988:243).  
Centrally, this addressed the very possibility of theorizing rituals and: 
 
the crucial issue of the plurality of ritual orders.  Is the same set of events and 
roles, the same activity system (Goffman 1961c:8) framed in just one standard 
fashion, all variations being simply variations on a theme, or must we speak of 
etiquettes instead of etiquette; of distinctive ceremonial orders, each with their 
own motif? (Strong 1988:243, original emphasis) 
 
Here Strong encounters a difficulty with Goffman: simply that “Goffman’s own 
position […] hard to judge” (Strong 1988:243), but Strong argued his own position 
was that: 
 
within any one order, there can be many reasons for variation.  […] However, 
what that [pediatric] research also revealed was that amongst these 
consultations there were at least three basic ritual orders.  The ‘ideal model’ 
which Goffman sketched of the server-client relationship [Goffman 1961] was 
certainly among these but it was not the only one” (Strong 1988:243, 
emphasis added).  
 
Strong explicated four models of consultation etiquette using his own empirical 
research: aristocratic; private; bureaucratic and; charity.  Essentially, this expanded 
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and refined Goffman’s original model.  The criticism of Goffman’s basic model is 
clear: “his assumption of just one ideal form looks rather parochial: ethnocentric, 
ahistorical and middle class” (Strong 1988:243).  Strong’s theoretical innovation is 
therefore the use of Goffman’s original theoretical idea with the new characterizations 
of the server-client relationship.   
 
Strong and the four ceremonial orders. 
Strong explicates the four models he identified in the clinic encounters.  The most 
common form of ritual (or ceremonial order) was the ‘bureaucratic format’ that 
dominated every Scottish NHS consultation and most non-fee-paying American 
patient consultations.  What he termed the ‘charity’ and the ‘private’ modes of 
exchanges were routinely to be found in server-client exchanges.  The bureaucratic 
mode applied a positive character definition of the client, but this was reversed in the 
charity and private modes.  Hence “every mother was now stupid, lazy and 
incompetent and unloving, unless she could prove otherwise” (Strong 1988:244).  
Strong emphasized that this shift held important implications for the individual actor 
in that it threatened their moral status whereas, in contrast, the other two modes called 
for only relatively superficial facework.  In the charity and private modes, much more 
was at stake, namely, “the overt and detailed investigation of the moral character of a 
key participant.  Such […] character work [for Strong] is a very different kind of 
moral work to the cosmetic facework of the [other] two ritual orders” (Strong 
1988:244, original emphasis). 
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This distinction is significant: in terms of the basic claims that it makes for (a) 
theorizing interactional encounters and (b) the increased capacity of the individual 
participants to shape the ritual order of the encounter: 
 
This discovery of radically different expressive orders, co-existing within the 
same type of encounter, is not, from a common sense point of view, 
particularly surprising.  […]  However, it seems to be an important break from 
Goffman’s own discussion of the ritual order.  For once we admit the 
possibility that the same activity may be ritually framed in very different 
ways, then we also give space for a mechanism through which systematic 
variations in the balance of power between participants may, in turn, have 
systematic effects upon the ritual order of their encounters. (Strong 1988:244, 
emphasis added) 
 
The use of the word ‘systematic’ is important.  By emphasizing the balance of power 
between social actors outside of the encounter, Strong is moving to entertain debates 
relating to “micro and macro worlds” or influences outside the encounter, but that 
nevertheless shape its outcome (Strong 1988:245, original emphasis).  For 
interactionists, the danger here is in doing so, Strong may have moved towards a more 
structuralist orientation than is ontologically compatible with Goffman’s work.  That 
is, his re-working of Goffman’s work is such that the essence of the original is lost – 
the metaphorical baby is thrown out with the bathwater.  Fortunately, Strong’s 
sustained interest in Goffman’s sociology prevented any superficial reading or 
application of the latter’s work12 and the macro-micro tension within Goffman’s 
                                                 
12
 Indeed, they corresponded during the last few years of Goffman’s life. 
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work, so often discussed elsewhere (Giddens 1988; Chriss 1995), received close 
attention.  
 
Strong represented his take on Goffman’s stance on the agency-structure dualism 
through the metaphor of a membrane.  This membrane separates the encounter from 
the wider, macro world.  Strong perceived that Goffman’s sociological interests lay 
with the contents of the membrane, rather than the external macro world itself.  
However, Strong perceived that the very metaphor of the membrane invites some kind 
of – admittedly loose – coupling between micro and macro worlds.13   In turn, 
coupling implies the capacity for tight or loose-knit couplings and that in tightly-
coupled settings, power is more expressly performed: 
 
Nonetheless, the fact that he did not [pay much attention to the influence of 
the macro world upon the interactional order] does not mean that we cannot.  
Indeed, it only makes sense to stress loose-coupling, if we also recognize the 
phenomenon of tight-coupling too; that particular power is liable to breed 
particular ceremony. (Strong 1988:246, original emphasis) 
 
On this point Strong diverges most from Goffman’s original position, by arguing that 
– on occasions – forms of rituals will be more strongly influenced by the external 
world.  That Strong’s argument is the outcome of detailed empirical exploration, 
adaptation and refinement of Goffman’s original theoretical statement through an 
ethnographic research process lends his findings additional weight.  It is unlike 
Goffman’s, which can be placed into its historical context (as Strong does) and 
                                                 
13
 See Weick (1976) for the original application of ‘loose coupling’ in an organizational context.  
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understood as part of a programme to map and establish the interaction order as a 
viable arena for sociological analysis (Goffman 1983).  In the case of server-client 
relations, Strong detailed “a central ceremony which stems from and is tightly linked 
to the outer world” (Strong 1988:246).  In this sense, Strong’s understanding of 
Goffman is that external forces are present, but that the encounter is of key 
ontological importance.  The encounter remains an important site where facework and 
the moral character of individuals are brought into play. 
 
Summary and conclusion 
The article has argued that (1) Strong was able to subject Goffman’s ideas to 
empirical testing and (2) was successful in further developing Goffman’s ideas on 
ceremony.  In doing so, he (3) demonstrated that ethnography can be more productive 
in developing theoretical ideas, but this relied upon Strong’s personal enthusiasm for 
theory and fieldwork .  His theoretical empiricism provides an exemplar of the way 
theory and conceptual refinement can grow as a result of doing ethnography the right 
way. 
 
Firstly, this (1) required preparing theoretical ideas for empirical testing.  Currently, 
there is an amnesia or lack of preparation in ethnographic research and hence an 
unfamiliarity with the ontological and epistemological thinking underpinning the use 
of such an approach (Atkinson and Housley 2003; Atkinson 2005).  This is perhaps a 
result of the explosion in qualitative studies, conducted without due attention to the 
traditions and theoretical ideas to which they are tied (Pole and Morrison 2003) as 
competent ethnography is grounded in theory.  Strong’s preparation and interest in 
Goffman counters any such criticism.  He was also cautious and reminds those who 
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may follow (despite his own success in relation to the ceremonial order), there is a 
need to remain modest as to the explanatory power of any given theory: 
 
Such a model needs a good deal of further empirical testing and, besides, even 
if correct, it is only one of the many, many links which bind the micro to the 
macro worlds, all of which need detailed exploration.  However, if such a 
program of research were ever to be undertaken, it might no longer be possible 
to claim that the core matters of sociology could be nicely studied without any 
reference to the interaction order.  But of course, so far at least, we are a very 
long way off that. (Strong 1988:247). 
 
Secondly, Strong also successfully (2) refined Goffman’s ideas, using sound 
ethnographic research protocols as a basis . The dataset which grounded the analysis 
was substantial and Strong’s zeal for fieldwork clear (observing 1120 consultations 
across three years).  Because Strong takes such an express interest in the development 
of Goffman’s ideas, the piece he offers is highly reflexive in a way that (whilst 
fashionable now) was unusual in its time.  Fortunately, it allows the process through 
which Strong’s own commentary on the ceremonial order emerged to be traced.  For 
example, Strong’s interest in structure (which was key to his expansion of Goffman’s 
work) drew from the empirical data when he moved to consider the wider 
circumstances surrounding the encounter.  For example, Strong described a mother 
and baby from “a family who have been notorious amongst health and social-service 
staff for three generations” (Strong 1988:240).   
 
There is, at least, the potential for a much wider capacity towards generalization: 




An intriguing relationship did emerge between the different ceremonial orders 
and particular balances of power; a relationship which a priori seems true not 
just of paediatric clinics but of many other kinds of customer service, and one 
which can also be illustrated from a wide variety of other research. (Strong 
1988:246-247) 
 
There is cross-site opportunity for analysis as well as focusing down upon how actors’ 
roles are mediated by the more powerful players present in the setting.  For example, 
Strong’s (1988) work on the denial of the child’s individual autonomy or agency in 
the medical encounters that he observed is in many senses evocative of the ‘new’ 
sociology of childhood’s call for a more realized definition of the child as a social 
actor in their own right (Christensen and Prout 2002; James and Prout 1997; Pole 
2007).  This is brought into sharp relief in settings or institutions traditionally defined, 
controlled and regulated by adults.  There is a clear mandate for future research to 
explore these processes. 
 
(3) Yet, given Strong’s own success in synthesizing theory and method, does his work 
on Goffman constitute a model for future ethnographers to pursue theory 
accumulation programs?  What lessons does his work offer us, beyond their specific 
focus?  The lessons are less tangible than an empirical legacy.  Foremost, was his skill 
and disposition towards fieldwork.  His close affinity with Goffman’s work is evident 
in his excellent critical obituary (Strong 1983).  Such an affinity was crucial, as it was  
this very predisposition towards Goffman that informed his sustained attempt to 
develop a theoretical idea through ethnography.  In this case study, therefore, it was 
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his passion for Goffman’s works that inspired Strong rather than a wider obligation to 
be found within sociology to pursue theoretical ideas and theory accumulation 
(although Strong also draws on Schutz’s phenomenology on other projects). 
 
The historical timing and sub-discipline in which Strong worked were also undeniably 
favorable.  In contrast to other examples of theory-accumulation through an 
ethnographic research process (such as Hargreaves, Lacey and Ball), the medical 
context of Strong’s work was one in which qualitative methods were well established, 
whereas Hargreaves and Lacey’s approaches were critiqued for their lack of 
observational sophistication (Delamont 1984).  Goffman had been seeking to establish 
the interaction order as a legitimate field of sociological work, whereas Strong 
enjoyed being part of a wave of interactionist studies reaching across UK sociology – 
indeed, he was part of its dissemination in various UK universities. 
 
It is this historical context and foundational knowledge of the ideas surrounding the 
interactional order that underpinned his ethnography.  Whereas Goffman could be 
accused of conceptual imperialism, for Strong, the theoretical tail was not wagging 
the empirical dog.  His work reminds us that that claims made on the basis 
ethnographic evidence should be reasonable and also constitute some form of ‘rolling 
program’ of theoretical ideas.  Bloor (1996) noted that Strong’s “death robbed us of 
our most accomplished essayist”14 and he further suspected that this was where 
Strong’s contribution to sociology would lie (Bloor 1996:551).  But such style was 
underpinned by substance.  For Strong shows how theoretical accumulation can take 
place though ethnographic research.  The best of Goffman’s theoretical richness 
                                                 
14
 Referring to the medical sociology community. 
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wedded to excellent ethnographic practice.  This model, of consistent theoretical 
commitment alongside empirical substance, is both a rich, modest and demanding one 
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